In the modern community, global effort is required to reduce the CO 2 emissions resulting from human actions to acceptable levels. However, global objectives may contradict individual benefits; attempts to reduce CO 2 emissions can result in the commons dilemma. This paper explores how the cooperation of individual households can be invoked to achieve a global target of reducing CO 2 emissions from households (HACO 2 ) in cities. A commons payoff function linked household benefits to the number of cooperators in a city: a CO 2 emission trading scheme (CETS) for households was introduced into the payoff function as a way to support cooperators. A multi-agent simulator was applied to a search for relationships among parameters in the payoff function and social cooperation from households (R). Results indicate that levying only household maintenance charges is an ineffective way to gain the cooperation of more than half of the households in a city, and extremely high maintenance also discouraged cooperative behavior; the use of CETS could increase cooperation, and R > 0.6 when emission trading prices were five times higher than unit reduction costs, and when unit maintenance charges were almost the same as reduction costs; and it was impossible to gain cooperation from all households until opinions about resource use and reducing emissions were changed.
Introduction 1.1 The tragedy of the commons
published an article discussing the dilemma of the commons. Commons refers to any resource (e.g., fish, water, forest, or clean air) shared by a group of people. Every member of a society has the right to take from and add to the commons resource pool. To accumulate wealth, each member believes that he/she must acquire one unit of resource or dump one unit of waste while distributing one unit of cost across all members with whom resources are shared. Thereby, individual gain appears large and cost appears very small. Ultimately, as a population grows and greed runs rampant, this system collapses and ends in "the tragedy of the commons."
Human activities have changed atmospheric composition; they are responsible for excessive increases of CO 2 in the air (Karl and Trenberth, 2003) . In the modern community, global effort is required to reduce the CO 2 emissions resulting from human actions to acceptable levels (Kyoto Protocol, 1992) . However, global objectives may contradict individual benefits, so attempts to reduce CO 2 emission can lead to a type of commons dilemma. Humans share the earth's atmosphere, into which they freely emit CO 2 . In terms of households, the environmental load from one household is then multiplied by all households in the area. Reducing CO 2 emissions could limit household activity and increase costs to the family budget; those who do nothing to reduce CO 2 emissions pay nothing. While there is an obvious payoff from cooperative activity, according to game theory, defectors tend to win in a commons dilemma (Yamamoto, 2003) . As a result of these circumstances, global warming is likely to reach damaging levels. The cost of controlling carbon emissions is high and a hydrogen-dependent economy may only be a dream (Kennedy, 2003) . According to Hardin (1968) , there is no technical solution to the problem. Can the catastrophe be averted?
Researchers have developed practical instruments for controlling environmental impact. One remarkable effort is a CO 2 emission trading scheme (CETS), which allows domestic companies to trade a CO 2 emission allowance (CEA). CETS has been implemented worldwide because of its cost effectiveness (Nishimura, 2004) .
The Public Welfare Department is responsible for 28.7% of the total anthropogenic CO 2 emission, and 45% of this fraction comes from households (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2004). Significant increases in these CO 2 emissions highlighted the importance of controlling CO 2 emissions at the household level (Ministry of Environment, 2005) . With respect to individual households, our previous study proposed an instrument to manage housing arrangement based on the maximum average gross floor area (GFA) in an urban condition given a constraint on a household's annual CO 2 emission (HACO 2 ) (Tang et al., 2005) . HACO 2 was defined as the sum of the CO 2 emission during the life cycle of house construction and operation (LCCO 2 ) (Munemoto et al., 2002) and CO 2 emissions resulting from commuting (CTCO 2 ). The given constraint led to a trade-off between LCCO 2 and CTCO 2 . Simulations revealed that both household location and resident commuters' modes of transportation affected housing arrangement, suggesting the constraint could influence household activity. A feasibility study showed the practicability of introducing CETS among households (Kondo et al., 2003) . Recently, we expanded HACO 2 to include the CO 2 emitted from energy usage in daily life (ELCO 2 ) and further evaluated the consequences of introducing a household CETS (Tang et al., 2006) . Simulations revealed that a CETS could affect household activities, effectively reduce household costs, and subsequently lead to a compact city. However, the study was based on the assumption that all households would cooperate to reduce CO 2 emission, which is often not the case, as shown by the commons dilemma.
Purpose
T h i s s t u d y e x p l o r e d m e t h o d s f o r i n v o k i n g cooperation from individual households to reach a global target of reducing HACO 2 within cities. A commons payoff function linked household benefits to the number of cooperators in a city, and a household CETS was introduced into the payoff function as a way to support cooperators. A city household was treated as an agent in a multi-agent system (MAS); a multiagent simulator was applied to search for relationships among the parameters in the payoff function and the social cooperation of households.
The study addressed the following questions: 1) How does CETS influence the payoff function and household cooperation in reducing CO 2 emissions?
2) Is it possible to increase social cooperation by applying a household CETS?
Method and Materials 2.1 MAS-based model
A MAS is composed of several agents capable of reaching goals that are difficult to achieve (Weiss, 1999) . All the agents have an identical internal structure, including goals, domain knowledge, possible actions, and decision procedures. This study adopted a multi-agent simulator to construct a model in which a household acts as an agent. Agents do not affect others directly, but because of physical proximity, the behaviors of one agent will change the sensory inputs of the others and thereby influence their behaviors.
Household as an agent in MAS
In this study, 'household' refers to a nuclear family belonging to the same social group. Family members were assumed to live in the same detached house, and one member was assumed to be a commuter working in the city. This research used a representative wooden standard house model (SHM) with a gross floor area of 125.9 m 2 ( Fig.1.) . Annual CO 2 emission from the household (HACO 2 (kg-C/yr)) includes LCCO 2 , CTCO 2 , and ELCO 2 , and can be expressed as
The life cycle of a residential building includes several stages including material production, construction, occupation and repair, recycling and disposal, etc. LCCO 2 is the sum of CO 2 emissions during all stages; an approach proposed by Munemoto et al. (2002) can be used to estimate the LCCO 2 of a detached house.
In Japan, the average CO 2 emission resulting from household electric power consumption (four family members) was 2000 kg-CO 2 /yr (545.0 kg-C/yr) in 2000
Note [1] . This study used this value as the initial value of ELCO 2 for each household.
CTCO 2 relates to a vehicle and commuting distance using the following formula:
where Tt i represents CTCO 2 (kg-C/yr), D j represents the commuting distance by vehicle j (km), and E j represents the CO 2 emission unit of vehicle j (kg-C/ km.yr.p).
Note [2] Our previous study examined the effects of different vehicles on the energy-efficient housing arrangement (Tang et al., 2005) . For simplicity, cars were the only mode of transportation considered.
In the MAS-based model, each agent was labeled cooperative (C) or defective (D) in reducing HACO 2 emission: a cooperative agent took action to reduce CO 2 emission (Agent-C) and a defective agent acted in no way to reduce emissions (Agent-D). An Agent-C could become an Agent-D if it changed its behavior, and vice versa.
Environment
Urban space served as the MAS-based model environment; houses were randomly located within this space. Commuting distances for each household did not exceed 50 km, and the number of households in the city was assumed to be constant. The city's management department gave each household a reasonable constraint on their CO 2 emissions within a designated period. 
Payoff function
Reducing CO 2 emission involves additional expense to an agent. Defection, i.e., taking no action, involves no expense. A strategy of levying maintenance charges for environmental recovery was applied to prohibit defective behavior. If maintenance charges are related to the number of cooperators, the payoff function for each household can be expressed as where f represents the expense to an agent (the payoff value), b represents either C or D behavior, RC represents the cost of reduction, N represents the number of households in the city (N = {1, 2, …, n}), nC represents the number of cooperators (nC = 0, 1, …, n … 1), and L represents the unit maintenance charge (monetary unit) (L >= 0).
T h e p a y o ff f u n c t i o n a p p l i e s t h e f o l l o w i n g characteristics to represent the commons dilemma:
In the short term, payoff from cooperation is always lower than payoff from defection, if nC is neglected. As a result, the great number of Agent-Ds would never allow the global reduction target to be met.
2
) f(C,N -1) > f(D,0)
. If all agents select C, the resulting payoff would be greater than if all agents select D.
3) f(C,nC) is a monotone increase function of nC. In the long term, a greater nC would result in a greater payoff from C.
A cooperative household could reduce its HACO 2 to levels lower than the HACO 2 constraint for an individual household. CETS would allow remaining CEA to be sold via the trading market, and profits earned from selling CEA would encourage this cooperative behavior. After the introduction of CETS, the payoff function changes as follows:
where RC represents the total cost of reduction (monetary unit), and PS represents profit from CEA selling (monetary unit)
where t represents the number order of the current stage, uRC represents the unit reduction cost (monetary unit/kg-C), and iRT t represents the target reduction for an individual household at stage t (kg-C) where uPT represents the price of unit CEA (monetary
unit/kg-C).
If PS is greater than RC, Agent-C could receive a greater payoff than Agent-D. The greater the reduction in CO 2 emissions, the more profit Agent-C could earn. It is likely that this mechanism will invoke greater social cooperation toward reducing CO 2 emissions. In this study, the ratio of number of cooperators to total number of households (R = nC/N) is defined as an index of social cooperation. Payoff value is determined using parameters in the payoff function, such as unit reduction cost (uRC), cost of unit CEA (uPT), and unit maintenance charge (L). To simplify the relationship, uRC is assumed to be 1 (monetary unit), L is p times RC (L = p × RC t (p >= 0)), and uPT is a times uRC (uPT = a × uRC (a >= 0) ). The payoff function is thereby only a function of parameters a and p.
HACO 2 reduction process
The reduction process of HACO 2 can be divided into several stages. The global reduction target is to cut m% of total HACO 2 emitted from all households within a designed period. Fig.2 . illustrates the flow of the reduction process.
During the initial stage, the total HACO 2 from all households is calculated, and the global reduction target (gRT 0 ) is obtained based on the following formula:
where HC 0 represents the HACO 2 emitted by all households during the initial stage (kg-C/yr), and m represents the reduction rate (%).
During this first stage, global reduction target gRT 0 is divided according to the total stage number (T) and number of households (N). Part of this target involves the individual reduction target for each household during this stage (iRT 0 ). Any reduction that is not achieved during this stage will be applied to the next stage; a greater remainder will produce a higher reduction target for the next stage. Therefore, the reduction target for an individual household at stage t (iRT t ) is determined by the household meeting the target during the previous stage. This is illustrated with the following formula:
where ∑F represents reduced CO 2 emissions during previous stages (kg-C) (at 1 st stage, ∑F = 0), t represents the number order of the current stage, T represents the number of total stages, and N represents the number of households in the city.
Reduced 
Simulation
Our simulation was built using a multi-agent simulator software platform Note [3] . The initial condition, global target, and termination condition were given as follows.
Environmental initial condition: In the initial phase, numbers of Agent-Cs and Agent-Ds were assumed to be equal, so the initial ratio of cooperation was 0.5 (R 0 = 0.5).
Global reduction target: The target was set at a 10% reduction in initial CO 2 emission within a designated period of 100 stages (m = 10%, T = 100). These initial values were arbitrarily set and can be changed.
Terminate condition: Iteration stops at the end of the period or when the global reduction target is achieved. Fig.3 . illustrates how agents interact with the environment. Each step is a reduction stage. At the beginning of each stage, an agent calculates his/her HACO 2 emissions based on commuting distance, and judges whether or not these emissions are greater than the given CO 2 constraint. Next, the agent inputs his/ her assigned individual reduction target (iRT t ) and the number of cooperators during the previous stage (nC t-1 ). The environmental information is used to estimate the payoff for Agent-C or Agent-D, which the agent uses to selects either C or D behavior. This selection is based on a roulette strategy at a probability of the proportion to payoff amount: the greater the payoff, the higher the probability for selection of Agent-C behavior. An Agent-C can become an Agent-D if he/she selects D behavior, and vice versa.
During each stage, the number of cooperators is calculated and the global reduction target for the next stage is determined based on agent output.
To clarify the effects of introducing CETS, simulations were performed without CETS (a = 0) and with CETS (a > 0).
In addition, to test sensitivity of the defined input values, i.e., initial cooperation (R 0 ) and global targets (m) resulting from the value of R, simulations involved changing m and R 0 individually while maintaining a constant α and p.
Results and Discussion

Results from simulations without a CETS
When simulations did not include a CETS (a = 0), p varied from 0 to extremely large values; p > 0 indicated a maintenance charge (L = p × RC t ) was levied from a household, and p = 0 indicated that the household was not required to pay a maintenance charge. Simulations without a CETS investigated relationships between the values of maintenance charges and social cooperation. Fig.4 . illustrates corresponding changes in R for a specific p. Fig.5 . illustrates relationships of R versus p, the values of which were averaged over 100 stages. When p = 0, R decreased from 0.5 to 0, so the payoff for Agent-D equals 0 while the payoff for Agent-C equals reduction cost (RC t ), which is a negative number. These results indicate that if no legal prohibition on defection is applied, social cooperation will become 0. The environment would be damaged and the situation would end in the 'tragedy of the commons.' When p is slightly greater than 0 (e.g., p = 0.1), R is relatively stable at around 0.4. When p = 1, f(C,nC) = f(D,nC), R increases to around 0.5. However, R displays no obvious changes after this point, even if p continues to increase. This is because although p could be greater than 1, the difference between payoffs for Agent-C and Agent-D is too small to encourage cooperative behavior in agents. In this case, a maintenance charge applied to prohibit defective activity would fail to increase levels of social cooperation. In addition, extreme expense may result in discouraging both defective and cooperative behavior. 
Results from simulations with a CETS
Since uPT is defined as a times uRC (uPT = a × uRC (a >= 0)), a is therefore a real number. However, an extremely large a, which would represent an extremely high selling price of CEA, is not reasonable. In simulations performed with a CETS, both a and p ranged from 0 to 10. Fig.6 . illustrates social cooperation (R) varying with a and p. One dot denotes a combination of a, p, and R. Most dots are located at around R = 0.5. Dots with low R cluster at locations where p is around 0 but a ranges from 0 to 1. R does not gradually change with increased a and p; rapid change occurs when a > 5 and p is around 1. High levels of social cooperation appear when R > 0.6, and the highest R values are achieved when a = 10 and p = 1. Thousands of simulations using such a combination showed it was possible to obtain R around 0.7, but it was very difficult to obtain R values greater than 0.7. Fig.7 . shows sensitivity of the initial cooperation (R 0 ) and the global reduction rate (m) to the resulting R value. No obvious differences appeared between R values resulting from m = 50%, 30%, 3%, and R 0 = 0, 1. Similar results were obtained when changes were made in numbers of agents (N) and/or numbers of reduction stages (T). R is more dependent on a and p, and less dependent on initial input values.
Sensitivity of R to initial input values
Conclusions
This study addressed how cooperation from individual households could be invoked for the purpose of achieving a global target of HACO 2 reduction in cities. Introducing a CETS to create a payoff function supports household cooperation towards HACO 2 reduction. It was impossible to gain cooperation from all households until opinions about resource use and reducing emissions were changed. The following points summarize our findings. 1) Levying only household maintenance charges is an ineffective way to gain the cooperation of more than half of the households in a city, and extremely high maintenance also discouraged cooperative behavior. 2) Use of CETS could increase cooperation, and R > 0.6 when emission trading prices were five times higher than unit reduction costs (a > 5), and when unit maintenance charges were almost the same as reduction costs (p = 1). 3) While CETS is an efficient strategy to invoke cooperation, it is impossible to obtain cooperation from all households. Payoff value can be influenced via financial incentives, such as a household CETS. This can help to reduce the total HACO 2 emissions in a city. Some parameters, such as the price of emission trading, are difficult to determine, but development of environmental policies could be aided by examining the combinations of parameters that this study found to be relevant to social cooperation. 
